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On Treating Obsessive Compulsive Personality Disorder

Given absurd federal regulations, we have to schedule courses and pick books nearly a year before teaching them. So it was last summer when I adopted Robert Feinstein, ed., Personality Disorders (Oxford University Press, 2021). We are finishing up the semester with that book, and recently focused on the chapter on Obsessive Compulsive Personality Disorder (OCPD), the epidemiology of which here and elsewhere often suggests it is perhaps the most widespread of all the personality disorders. 

In re-reading the chapter for class, I realized that a new case--which has been difficult to conceptualize coherently because psychological issues are intercalated with a rare and unpredictable multi-symptomatic cardiovascular condition about which medical science knows little to date--matched DSM-V criteria for OCPD.

Following this minor epiphany, I indulged my own OCD-ish tendencies by spending about 6 hours ransacking the databases to see what else I could find on OCPD that was useful. Herewith some results of that unsystematic survey.

In the first place, far and away the most helpful thing has been the chapter, "The Obsessive-Compulsive Patient" in The Psychiatric Interview in Clinical Practice by Roger A. Mackinnon, Robert Michels, and Peter J. Buckley. They have captured to an astonishing degree what I have seen, and highlighted two things I had seen but not thought clinically significant. They also give some very helpful recommendations on techniques, two of which I have already tried and found very fruitful. To read page after page of this chapter was to feel like pieces falling into place at long last, and a clarity which has frustratingly eluded us, "its hour come round at last," now emerging. To document all the insights of this article would take too long. Suffice it for me to say that if you can't read anything else noted here, read this!

After that chapter, I found my longstanding practice of returning to earlier writers never fails to pay dividends. Thus I read the late (d.2009) Georgetown psychiatrist Leon Salzman's article "Psychotherapy of the Obsessional," American Journal of Psychotherapy (1979). This then reminded me that I had, some time back, been given a copy of his 1968 book, The Obsessive Personality: Origins, Dynamics, and Therapy. I retrieved it and perused it. The whole thing seems to have held up very well, in my view, and is not only helpful and interesting but written in a remarkably accessible way. The last section of the book gives many similar technical recommendations as he did in the 1979 article linked above. 

E.g., he begins by noting the obsessional's "extraordinary capacity" to "evade, distract, obfuscate, and displace" in order to avoid confrontation and change. This is very much my experience to date. The author recommends ensuring a solid working alliance is in place before moving slowly and gently but firmly to confrontation of these maladaptive coping mechanisms, aware that the obsessional's perfectionism (about which see below) will make such confrontation slow-going, partial, and halting--but essential nonetheless.  

Psychodynamic clinicians, confronted with the relentlessly controlling and perfectionistic instincts of the obsessional, might be tempted, as I was early (too early!) in one treatment to encourage the patient to make great use of free association, but Salzman warns--and my mistakes again confirm!--that too heavy an insistence upon free association "might often aggravate the problem" by burying "the therapy under endless trivia." This is where some guidance may be necessary, and again some confrontation if the patient seems clearly to be free-associating in an obfuscating or evasive fashion. On this point Salzman bluntly advocates that "the therapist curtail techniques which defeat communication."

The broader metapsychological issue for the obsessive is the unwillingness or inability to deal with the universal human problems of ambiguity and ambivalence. These create a paralyzing anxiety in the obsessive, and the work of therapy will be centred here, helping the patient come to appreciate "the universality of anxiety" while stressing, and building up, the patient's inner capacity to handle this. Salzman says that in working on this issue it is best to stay in the moment and make use of "here-and-now" material. This is, in fact, a frequent technical recommendation he makes in this article and in his book: to draw on daily experiences, and the therapeutic relationship in the present, while gradually closing off the obsessive's recourse to past events.

In particular, the things that are frustrating about, and enraging in, treatment are especially to be focused upon: the therapist's mistakes (whether legitimate or perceived) as well as the patient's "feelings of distrust, dislike, or liking for the therapist" should be shared even though doing so is of course difficult. On this point Salzman says to watch out for the the obsessive's tendency to observe with exactitude, and externally comply with, the rituals and rules of therapy while seeking to defy them internally. This is the central bind of the obsessive--defiance vs. obedience or conformity, themes well covered in The Psychiatric Interview--and it will be particularly manifested in what he calls subtle, perhaps even petty, complaints about time, fees, office decor, the therapist's choice of dress, or similar matters. 

What these complaints mask is the patient's inability to make use (cf. Winnicott's understanding of use vs. exploitation) of the therapist in a deeper way at this point. Instead, the therapist will be confronted with the task of slowly but steadily wresting from the patient, one by one, his many defense mechanisms (cf. "Remembering, Repeating, and Working Through"), including the one that manifests as perfect outward compliance to the requirements of therapy. Some patients (a common theme in the literature, and also confirmed by my experience) will bring lists of things to each session they claim to want to remember to mention, or to prove how actively they are thinking about the session, or doing some apparent "homework" after the session. There is a strong consensus in the articles covered here that bringing such lists should be forbidden as soon as feasible. 

What you will rarely hear from the obsessive are warm, tender feelings or affectionate reactions. These are guarded against with characteristic fierceness, but as the therapy unfolds must gradually be encouraged and brought into view. One way I have found to "sneak" these in, as it were, is to invite the patient to share dreams. Many of them (and I have sometimes felt this in my own analysis) seem to have a curious distance on their dreams, as though they originated outside of their minds. So they will sometimes share warm, vulnerable, affectionate, moving dreams without being concerned or even very conscious of those dynamics. Such dreams can sometimes be processed in the moment or, as I have done, stored up in your memory for recall later at a more opportune moment when the alliance is stronger and the patient's capacity to experience warm emotions less heavily defended against. 

To do such things, Salzman says, you must help the patient "see how it will benefit him." They need to see, in other words, how becoming less angry and defiant, less controlling and more vulnerable, less cold and more warm, helps here and now. One way you can encourage such feelings to emerge more regularly (and here Salzman's advice shows up in other articles cited here) is to be more active and spontaneous in session as a clinician, changing parts of how sessions unfold to prevent them from becoming too ritualized and predictable, thereby reinforcing the obsessive's sense of control. You can also, he says, take some risks in sharing your own "doubts and uncertainties" as well as your own "weaknesses." Thus do not be afraid of "spontaneity, direct confrontation, and activity...to reduce distracting behavior."

From here we turn to Crayton Rowe, "Treatment of an Obsessive-Compulsive Personality Disorder: A Self Psychological Perspective," Psychoanalytic Social Work (2020). Rowe proposes, following Kohut, that "undifferentiated selfobjects" are the key to the development of various personality disorders, including OCPD. In particular detail, he highlights the threefold needs of such patients for:

        Mirroring:     To be recognized

        Idealizing:     To be aware of a new life, of new possibilities for living differently

        Twinship:      To experience companionship, in the therapist and beyond.

These (often insufficiently met developmental) needs are in competition with a developmental failure that left the patient often feeling "disappeared" early in life. This may lead some patients, he says, to come to therapy with notes, lists, and similar materials constantly written out in an effort to prove they exist. The use of such notes must gradually be discontinued while the therapy seeks to encourage a rediscovery of curiosity about the self and the patient's life. This goal will be constantly challenged by a patient "preoccupied with thoughts that are symbolic of disappearance." 

These dynamics are explored within the context of a case study about a patient in his 40s, an accountant, who had OCPD. Treatment was twice weekly for six years. Countertransference issues are briefly mentioned: these focus on a demand for instant results entirely engineered by the therapist, who thus feels enormous pressure to make the problems go away without any curious exploration of them. 

Two remaining useful articles include, first, Simone Cheli et al., "The Intertwined Path of Perfectionism and Self-Criticism in a Client with Obsessive-Compulsive Personality Disorder" in the Journal of Clinical Psychology (2020). This article and the one below are both Italian studies and both from a metacognitive perspective. 

I have been reading works in both mentalization and metacognitive therapy, much of which seems to have been pioneered here in Indiana at the IU School of Medicine down in Indianapolis. It has been useful for work with psychotic and borderline conditions, but also, in my experience, is useful in nearly every clinical case. Though some might cavil at this, and I would not stand by the comparison in every respect, it is, I think, quite justifiable to say that, broadly considered, metacognitive therapy is just the "American" word for what Fonagy in England has called "mentalization." 

These authors argue that perfectionism remains understudied in the literature. They describe a case treated for six months with metacognitive therapy. These authors usefully if briefly review some other treatments and the evidence for them, noting (as others I have read also do) that we do not have a lot of well-studied treatments for OCPD. The literature consists, based on my unsystematic survey, of a number of individual case studies, or very small comparison studies. From this highly limited evidence base, it seems that metacognitive, psychodynamic, and schema therapies show much promise, along with some CBT techniques. 

Similar countertransference issues show up here as noted above: the pressure the therapist feels to instantly produce a perfect solution to the patient's problems, solving them after a session or two. ("From a MIT point of view, what the therapist feels, perceives, and, generally speaking, experiences constitutes a core component of the intervention.") 

Much of the rest of this article consists of a single case-report of a young female patient (described as highly motivated and without comorbidities) whose progress was measured using a number of instruments, including the SCID-5-PD at the end of six months and again at a one-month follow-up. Two key parts of perfectionism were shown to be significantly reduced. In the end, she no longer met the criteria for an OCPD diagnosis, and her life was significantly improved across a number of measures after a six-month treatment that made regular use of guided imagery, rescripting, and behavioral techniques.

A 2011 article, Giancarlo Dimmagio et al., "Progressive Promoting Metacognition in a Case of Obsessive-Compulsive Personality Disorder Treated with Metacognitive Interpersonal Therapy," Psychology and Psychotherapy: Theory, Research, and Practice offers an awareness of the similarities between metacognitive and mentalizing stances, directly and frequently drawing on Fonagy's research. It begins by recognizing the failures of patients in this regard who suffer from personality disorders. Such failures include a lack of self-reflection, a lack of "understanding others' minds," and an inability to engage in "decentering," that is, an inability to remove the self from a dominating and obscuring place on center-stage so as to see more clearly what others might be thinking. 

Metacognitive techniques are tailored to the patient, and from the outset the authors caution that in highly intellectually defended and controlling obsessives, it is necessary to begin at a basic level of trying to help them recognize what emotions feel like in the body and to name them. Some are unaware of the meaning of even such seemingly simple gestures as facial blushing. 

From here they recommend that the therapist show the patient how many perceived problems are "internalized, i.e., a stable tendency to see others as critical and react by feeling ashamed and withdrawing" before trying to challenge this. Treatment is divided into two phases: "stage-setting and change-promoting." In the former, autobiographical incidents are invited as material to begin to reflect on, challenging old understandings and beginning to inculcate new ones based on the patient's developing capacity to think how others thought at the time. These authors are aware that at both phases of therapy ruptures to the alliance may occur, but their discussion and repair will prove especially salutary to OCPD patients, one of whom they spend much of the rest of the article focusing on. 

What worked with her is what will work, they recommend, with others: a patient process of promoting not just thinking differently about past patterns, but behavior change in the present, though change understood and promoted in a way that does not risk reactivating the perfectionistic tendencies that have hitherto been so problematic. In this the authors recommend that therapists will "not force them to use psychological knowledge they have no access to, but will gradually promote metacognitive growth." This is very similar to something Fonagy says: a non-mentalizing stance in the patient cannot be met with a mentalizing stance in the therapist. The latter must encourage the former to develop their own capacity to mentalize. 

This, they conclude, makes metacognitive and mentalization therapies as perhaps more time-consuming than other approaches. The treatment studied in this article ran for a year, which they take as a minimum to provoke new ways of mentalization and metacognition. 

David Wallin on Attachment in Psychotherapy

This book, Attachment in Psychotherapy, has something of a legendary status in the field it seems to me, so it was on my long-term list of things I knew I must read at some point. But one of the things I learned from Nina Coltart is that clinical work has a way, largely unconsciously, of bumping things up your priority list depending on whom you are treating at any given moment. So with several new cases presenting with what seems to me dismissive and avoidant attachment histories that immediately seemed a threat to treatment even beginning, never mind proceeding successfully, I felt I had to do more work in both attachment and mentalization. So with gratitude and relief I picked up David Wallin's Attachment in Psychotherapy. 

The book begins with the ultimate hook to scholar-clinicians such as I: "How does psychotherapy enable people to change" (p.xi)? Whose blood is immediately not set aracing by such a crucial and intriguing question? 

He immediately posits that an answer to such a question almost certainly has something to do with giving a relational connection and context not unlike that of primary attachment figures in early life, here mentioning to me the surprising claim that Bowlby, famous for his attachment theory, was much more of a clinician than academic, seeing a considerable number of patients who seem to have occupied more time than I ever realized.  

Much of attachment begins at the most primitive, per-verbal levels, and Wallin here calls to mind Christopher Bollas and his notion of the unthought known. This is especially true for disavowed or dissociated experience, which may well end up, Wallin says, being enacted, embodied, or evoked in others. The therapist skilled in mentalization, Wallin says--here tying his own work to that of Fonagy (given his own chapter--#4) which I have also found, and continue to find, so very helpful--will help the patient see these three patterns and begin to reflect on and own them. The therapist who exhibits and encourages such mentalization will likely have a "contagious quality," helping the patient's capacities to expand and grow outside the consulting room.

Wallin also brings in the work of metacognition, which bears a good deal of similarity to mentalization, though the former term was primarily developed in the US while the latter in the UK. In the US Paul Lysaker is most associated with the term in my mind, and his work on metacognition in psychotic disorders informs my own clinical work and has proven very helpful. 

Ch.2, The Foundations of Attachment Theory, covers not just John Bowlby but also Mary Ainsworth's equally important pioneering work here. The gist of this is to show that "an abundance of follow-up studies has tended to show that the attachment patterns of infancy have long-term effects" (p.23). Another number of studies suggest that parents replicate with their infants and children their own attachment patterns and struggles.

Ch.3 focuses directly on Ainsworth, noting that "without a functioning capacity for metacognition, we may for the moment find ourselves in a particular state of mind; lacking such a capacity, it's as if we simply are that state of mind" (p.40). Helping my patients appreciate this has in several cases proven a turning point in treatment. They had hitherto felt helpless in certain affective states, as though controlled by them: Fonagy calls this "embeddeness." But being able to reflect on them, to sit with and observe them as they come and go, has been very helpful. 

As we move into ch.6 of Wallin's book, he makes a useful caveat that perhaps cannot be stated enough: "the fact is that their [patients'] complexity can never be adequately captured by a single descriptor--secure, dismissing, preoccuped, or unresolved" (p.96). Do not, in other words--as I constantly tell my students--expect to see people show up in your consulting room straight out of central casting, with clear, precise, unambiguous clinical presentation allowing you easily and immediately to tick some theoretical or diagnostic box--avoidant! bipolar! OCD! Rare are such patients. 

Ch.8 focuses explicitly on Bollas and the unthought known, emphasizing that patients who cannot put certain things into words will show us by their actions, and that enactments in therapy will also be crucial forms of communication. Here and in many other places in the book, Wallin stresses that with patients whose ability to communicate their struggles in words is limited, "we must tune in to our own subjective experience" (p.129). Such experience includes all of us: Wallin cautions that the "taking cure" must not be limited to "talking heads," but include the whole body. 

Resuming themes of mentalization, Wallin goes on to state quite clearly that "helping patients change their stance toward their own subjective experience depends, in part, on our explicit mentalizing." Lest some think this insufficient--where's the homework? work-sheets? skills building? breathing exercises?--he insists a little further down the same page that "rather than any particular understanding, it is the experience in which the patient feels understood--and inspired to understand herself--that is ultimately most therapeutic" (p.157). 

He resumes this theme later in the book, noting that "for patients who are unresolved the therapeutic relationship is the therapy" (p.244) and such therapy provides an "incremental achievement of a sense of safety in relation to the therapist," and to that extent may heal previously traumatic relationships. Put in classical terminology, psychotherapy that provides "the patient with a secure base" is offering him or her "a corrective relational experience that may be healing in its own right" (p.257).  

Ch.10 brings in the work of Phillip Bromberg, to whom I was recently introduced. His idea of multiple self-states, and of change being something more than a static end-point at which we arrive and stay, has been extremely illuminating for me. Wallin draws on him in this chapter as well as Bion's notion of helping the patient contain "disowned thoughts, feelings, and desires" which can be reintegrated once they have been held in mind by the psychotherapist (p.183). 

Wallin goes on to argue something that I have recently been learning (not without struggle!) from the new book of Karen Maroda (and before her from Nina Coltart and others): the need sometimes less for containment (pace Bion) and more for confrontation and challenge. As Wallin puts it simply, "it must be understood that our patients at times need confrontation more than they need empathy" (p.200). He seems to suggest a little later that this is especially so with those who exibit a predominantly avoidant and dismissive attachment style, clues about which can be found in a tendency to lapse into irrelevancies and to exhibit certain things bodily. For such patients, we need to combine "empathic attunement with confrontation" so that the dismissing patient is led to see "how he gets to us" (p.212). 

We do this, of course, not via a "barrage of honesty" but in a way that the "patient can make use of." In doing so, Wallin cautions toward the end of the book (repeating a theme throughout), we communicate usefully using words, but in other ways as well. If we are not attuned to non-verbal communication, our utility to the patient is going to be limited to just that extent. Thus we must cultivate what he calls "open presence" (310) and earlier "bare attention" (the exact phrase I first learned from Nina Coltart). Such bare attention, Wallin notes at the end of the book, should be offered with in "calm, quiet" ways, quoting one of Freud's technical papers from 1912 (to which Coltart says clinicians should return regularly). 

When we are communicating via words, Wallin hints that it is better to use observation statements than questions: "Generally I prefer to simply comment on what I think I see, letting the meaning emerge from the joint exploration the comment usually elicits" (p.299). 

In the end, we do all this, he says in a neat summary of the book, because "in the new attachment relationship we aim to provide for our patients, repeated experiences of disembedding through mindfulness as well as mentalizing can establish a competing centre of organization in both the mind and brain. In this way such experiences can potentially replace the patient's insecure working models with 'earned secure' ones" (p.337). 

Inculcating Psychological Mindedness for Use After Treatment

As so often happens, a comment on Twitter makes me think of a book I read that may have something useful to offer the conversation. In this case, it was a question about post-treatment goals in and for therapy, and whether they diverge that much between CBT and psychoanalytic practitioners. In particular, it was asked whether both traditions seek to create a capacity for what (following Nina Coltart) I would call a healthy psychological mindedness (a lack of which during intake bodes ill, as she says, and my experience confirms, for successful treatment). 

The question of post-treatment goes back, of course, to Freud's very late essay, "Analysis Terminable and Interminable," and its welcome ambivalence about whether one can ever be truly and totally and completely analyzed. I was very heartened precisely by his ambivalence in this essay. I also found it edifying that Freud seemed to recognize benefits might continue on even after analyst and analysand formally cease to meet together for sessions. 

In this regard, I often think of something Adam Philips (he whose books are so essentially aphoristic in nature) once said, which I have found incredibly true in my own life: "the cure can begin only after the treatment has ended." More recently, he has returned to the whole vexed question of cure in what I think is one of his best and most important books, The Cure for Psychoanalysis, which captures in one place a theme he has often advanced in just about every one of his previous books: about the sad irony that psychoanalysis has become--in many places, not least training institutes--a hidebound ideology instead of a means to free people from the prison of ideologies. 

For me, my first analysis (four times a week on the couch for almost seven years) ended in late July 2000 but I have found myself living from that in some useful ways ever since. And in fact I think the "returns," far from diminishing, actually grew in the years after treatment came to a formal end. (I would say the same thing of my second analytic therapy, which is ongoing.)

One person who has thought about this in an elegant and useful way is Fred Busch in his 2013 book, Creating a Psychoanalytic Mind: A Psychoanalytic Method and Theory.

Busch seems a very interesting fellow, and quietly understated pioneer of some sort. As he recounts in the introduction to this book, Busch was one of the first clinical psychologists to be admitted in the 1970s to psychoanalytic training at an American institute. American institutes, unlike those in Canada, the UK, and parts of Europe and elsewhere, generally have been extremely reluctant to admit any but psychiatrists or those with medical degrees. 

In this, they deplorably and unjustifiably take a different tack from what Freud recommended in The Question of Lay Analysis, a book where Freud memorably says two groups should most certainly keep their hands off psychoanalysis: doctors and clergy! He also coins a memorable phrase about analysts being "secular pastoral workers," a phrase to which I gave some attention elsewhere. 

I will not go into Busch's entire book, which I encourage everyone to read, but simply make a few brief observations based on notes I took years ago when first reading it.

Busch understands analysis to consist of three phases:

1) The first phase is when the patient comes to be familiar with his own inhibitions and restrictions that keep him from living: until the patient can wonder about his lack of wondering, wondering is not possible. This phase, later in the book, is called one of self-observation. 

2) The middle phase of an analysis is the creation of a "psychoanalytic mind," that is, learning to observe one's own mind and its sequence of free associations. Such a psychoanalytic mind is necessary if the analysis is to bear long-term sustainable fruits in one's life. It is necessary, that is, if the patient is to be freed from the "slavery of repetition compulsion" and instead freed to "think about thinking." Later in the book Busch calls this phase one of self-reflection. 

3) The terminal phase of an analysis consists of a deeper psychoanalytic mind more completely free from deceptions in understanding one's associations with greater veracity. Here the analysand can "play, muse, reflect, and interpret her own associations." This phase Busch later calls self-inquiry. 

Busch says that part of his practice consists in seeing patients for a second analysis. They have benefited from their first analysis, but from that largely derived only knowledge of their unconscious--an "object," as it were, rather than a process. And for Bush, "the process of knowing is as important as what is known." This, for me, is the very obvious difference between my first analysis (which I wanted simply to know what was unconscious and bring it forth for rational scrutiny and, especially, control!) and my second, which has focused much more on the process of knowing and far less on the contents. 

Busch continues in this vein, saying that he offers a different goal for analysis which, classically, has held up the importance of a state of knowing rather than a process of knowing. In the former, we come to know consciously what was previously unconscious. In the latter, the patient gains an understanding of how his mind works and how it affects him. Both offer freedom, albeit of a different degree and type, but Busch suggests the freedom of a psychoanalytic mind, with a process of knowing--in addition, and perhaps even preferable, to--what is known, may be of greater long-term benefit. I would heartily agree.