Posts

Showing posts with the label R.D. Laing

Beginning to Think about Delusions and Schizophrenia

I don't know why--my British-Canadian instincts to root for the underdog, perhaps?--but I have been haunted for a long time by stories of psychiatric patients and their abuses not just in the Soviet Gulag in the middle of the last century, but more recently, and in a supposedly "enlightened" and free country like the US--or Canada or the UK. The stories that remain with me are those of patients deemed and treated as though they are beyond reach--and this seems primarily to encompass people labeled "psychotic" or "schizophrenic." 

I have read stories of clinicians who were unwilling to simply write such people off, or consign them to subsisting in heavily drugged states in institutions, but have tried to reach, and even to heal, them, via psychotherapy. There are four such clinicians I have some familiarity with. What follows are just some initial reflections based on learnings gleaned from each of them. (I am not mounting a defense of all of them, or even each of them singly in every one of their views; nor am I conceiving of a grand theory of anything here.) 

I think the first clinician I encountered was R.D. Laing. About three years ago, reading of him somewhere and finding what I read interesting (alongside his Glaswegian heritage, which is that of my mother and maternal grandparents, who were born in and around Glasgow and lived up and down the River Clyde before emigrating to Canada), I got a copy of his semi-autobiographical Wisdom, Madness, and Folly: The Making of a Psychiatrist and read it with not just interest but real horror also, learning in there of certain techniques used less than a century ago with certain patients--e.g., insulin comas--alongside the often callous dismissal and virtual medical imprisonment of patients labeled psychotic and/or schizophrenic. 

Incidentally, numerous films and documentaries have been made about Laing, and Amazon Prime has the most recent, Mad to be Normal, which I watched with great interest. It gives no background to Laing, and only perfunctory (but damning) coverage of his shoddy treatment of his family and his many affairs and resultant children, but focuses almost entirely on the "experimental" community he founded and ran from 1965-70 in London at Kingsley Hall, a place where patients could live without judgment and enforced treatment--which was not unproblematic! 

Freud (without much experience) claimed--and everyone else seems mindlessly to have repeated--that psychosis and schizophrenia were impossible to treat with psychotherapy. Laing and a few others would show Freud to be wrong on this point. Laing was not successful with every patient, to be sure, but with enough that we must, if we are dispassionate clinicians of truly open minds weighing the findings of (loaded phrase!) an "evidence base" to consider his efforts seriously and give him credit--no matter the problems that come with some of his views, and certainly with his destructive conduct towards his children and wives. 

He writes about his clinical work in his earliest book, which I have just finished: The Divided Self: An Existential Study in Sanity and Madness. In this book, Laing writes of debts I did not know he had, including to Jock Sutherland (author of the interesting study Fairbairn's Journey into the Interior), Charles Rycroft, and the great D.W. Winnicott. 

True to his subtitle, Laing immediately dives into a claim--derived from Freud's Civilization and its Discontents--that what we call "psychosis" may be a sign of a serious split from the unbearable parts of our world, and thus have more of an external-social "cause" than an internal-biomedical one. He also notes that people locked in a psychotic state may--a theme also found, he notes, in Frieda Fromm-Reichmann (about whom see below)--be helped by the presence of a patient clinician: "since relatedness is potentially present in everyone, then he may not be wasting his time in sitting for hours with a silent catatonic who gives every evidence that he does not recognize his existence" (26). Fromm-Reichman says this, and so, as we shall see, does Christopher Bollas. 

A little later he returns to this theme, noting that the clinician must, at a minimum, make every effort to "know how the patient is experiencing himself and the world, including oneself. If one cannot understand him, one is hardly in a position to love him in any effective way" (34). 

Laing recounts an interesting claim of a patient in group therapy who felt another patient was threatening his existence and so the first patient became very argumentative precisely, he claimed, to preserve his existence. This leads Laing later in the chapter to caution (pace his earlier claim) that with some patients the therapist needs to be very careful not to extend love because it might in fact be more feared from and in the therapist than the latter's hatred. Themes of engulfment and annihilation abound here, as they will later in George Atwood, discussed below. But even more than in Atwood, Laing focuses on the necessity of a sense of autonomy in the patient, whose delusions may come about in part as a function of feeling that autonomy is under attack. 

As one comes to love a person diagnosed as schizophrenic, Laing counsels reading Kierkegaard, especially The Sickness Unto Death (which was my introduction to the Danish philosopher in high-school), saying that the clinician must first understand real despair (and Kierkegaard is an excellent guide to it) before understanding his schizophrenic patient, for the latter is nothing if not mired in despair. 

The middle section of The Divided Self is really focused on the schizoid personality, and the splitting characteristic of it. Here Laing's debts to Winnicott and Fairbairn are very clear. As we get into the final section, he deals more directly with schizophrenia, and provides in some chapters very extensive clinical material. He notes, however, something I have also found: "it is never easy to obtain an adequate account of a schizophrenic's early life. Each investigation into the life of any single schizophrenic patient is a laborious piece of original research" (179).

Laing notes something other authors have: violent fantasies and delusions, including of murder, are common in schizophrenics and reflect their sense of "having murdered their selves." He calls these delusions, but immediately says they "contain existential truth" (149).

Those in psychotic states are often known to speak what others regard as incomprehensible gibberish, but Laing notes that this is a deliberate defense mechanism: the "deliberate use of obscurity and complexity" reflects the fact that the patient is trying to scare away the doctor because the patient "is terrified of love" (163) and  wants to "avoid at all costs the possibility of being held responsible for a single coherent idea or intention" (164). 

Such are some of the gleanings from Laing which I will continue to think about. Many of them, as we will see presently, are very similar to those of George Atwood and Bollas again. 

Having finished Laing's The Divided Self, I have lined up next to read Daniel Burston's biography of Laing, The Wing of Madness: the Life and Work of R.D. Laing. (I interviewed Burston last year about his newest book.) Biographies have long been my go-to genre for bedtime reading, and I will get to this as soon as I finish another one currently underway, viz., Helen Swick Perry, Psychiatrist of America: the Life of Harry Stack Sullivan.

In addition to Laing, the other person who tried with some success to reach those often labeled as hopeless cases is Frieda Fromm-Reichmann. I have discussed her life and work here, so I will not say more about that now. She, too, remains a greatly admirable inspiration. 

Instead, let me turn to a clinician who is still alive: the retired Rutgers psychologist George Atwood, author of the recent book The Abyss of Madness. It is an enjoyable book, though the last chapter (focused entirely on 'existentialist' philosophers) seems rather tacked on and not at all integrated into the rest of the book, which mixes much good clinical sense with interesting case material. Atwood early on notes that "psychotherapy is always a dialogue between two universes, one that transforms both" (35). 

A little later in the book he comes to his titular focus, saying that "Madness is not an illness, and it is not a disorder. Madness is the abyss. It is the experience of utter annihilation" (41). Madness gains its terror, he suggests, because it raises the specter of falling into nonbeing. And madness should not be thought some rare and singular phenomenon that happens to others. Rather, Atwood suggests (and here he puts me in mind of Christopher Bollas, who has suggested that all of us cycle into and out of periods of 'madness' at some point, to greater or lesser degrees, but only a few of us get stuck there long enough to need or attract clinical attention), "the abyss is a universal possibility" (43). 

Much of the book is spent attempting to understand delusions, which at one point he regards as an attempt to restore a "lost connection to someone life-giving," a point he illustrates with an especially harrowing case study of a child devastated by paternal suicide (44). He found working with this severely delusional woman that it was necessary for him as a psychotherapist to feel and show her that he had a real "understanding of the horror" and saw his job as helping her return from the land of horrors. Doing this, he says, does not require a "diagnosis," which he sees as not just objectifying but reifying the delusion. Instead, she needed from him "validation and mirroring" (45). 

Much later in the book he returns to working out a definition of delusion, noting succinctly that it is "a belief, any belief, about the validity of which there can be no discussion" (p.99). Given that no discussion is possible, Atwood advises against making any comparisons between the delusion and "reality" for this will not help the patient. Instead, in an interesting turn of phrase earlier used in the book, such a comparison will awaken an "epistemological trauma" in the patient. (This phrase, and the way Atwood describes it, are very close to the great moral philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre's 1977 article on "Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative, and the Philosophy of Science," which I have often used with my students over the years.) 

Given that delusions admit of no debate, Atwood advises that the clinician discuss these delusions as one would discuss dreams, about which he has an entire very interesting chapter. (He counsels the wisdom of something I learned both from my own experience as an analysand, and also from Nina Coltart: pay attention to the first reported dream at the outset of treatment for it may well concern "the deepest theme of the treatment that is to come" [89].)

The similarities between dreams and delusions are threefold: neither follows laws of logic and rationality; both engage in condensation and concretization; and both can, with time, fade and be forgotten. 

I confess I wish I had finished this part of Atwood's book even a day earlier, for it would have come in handy with someone whose delusions I mistakenly tried repeatedly to challenge, without any discernible effect--other than making this person acutely uncomfortable and distant which, in turn, gave rise to a counter-transference image in my mind of a ship with a damaged rudder being blown in circles in the South Atlantic.

Atwood reports additional case material, including of a patient whose delusions about coming from a "family of vampires" made a lot of sense once the patient's history was known. The sense was derived not from comparing the delusion to some notion of reality, but instead by asking what the internal meaning for the patient might be. Here as in most other cases reported, the "madness" this patient suffered was a "result of the failure of sustaining human relationships" and, usually, "disastrous trauma," sometimes visible but sometimes not (55).

What are reported as "delusions" in children, Atwood suggests, may well be potent vehicles for some truth hitherto hidden or denied. When they express themes of murder and violence this may indicate not necessarily literal violence earlier in their life, but nonetheless a strong sense of having had something precious killed.

When he turns to schizophrenia, Atwood notes that patients carrying this diagnosis "often do not experience themselves as existing. They live in a felt state of nonbeing" (58-59). As a result of this claim, Atwood at several points cautions the clinician to remember, and remind the patient, that we all live in a common world as experiencing beings, but that our experiences can and do differ. Saying such a thing to such patients helps may help them feel less estranged and threatened. 

Let us turn directly to Bollas now, almost all of whose books I have read in the last 3 years. His first book, The Shadow of the Object: Psychoanalysis of the Unthought Known remains, to my mind, perhaps his most original and important. But two others are relevant here: Catch Them Before They Fall: the Psychoanalysis of Breakdown; and then especially When the Sun Bursts: the Enigma of Schizophrenia. I just ordered the former and hope to read it over Christmas; but I have now read the latter, on schizophrenia, and it is a very rich and rewarding book indeed. Bollas writes in here with an easy and sometimes "seductive" elegance, which one does not expect in a book devoted to often such disconcerting cases and their suffering. 

Commendably, in When the Sun Bursts, he notes some limitations at the outset: the book is not a textbook on schizophrenia but is simply based on his extensive clinical work, in England and the US, going back decades. Even with this, however, he lays no claim to be an expert in schizophrenia or anything else. As he rightly puts it, "no human life is long enough to allow any clinician to claim that he or she has truly grasped the meaning of any of the 'disorders'" (2-3). 

By the time I reached the end of the book, I had come back again to this realization with renewed gratitude. We do not need, and should rightly question, anyone--no matter how distinguished--laying down the law about what Disorder X, Y, or Z means in definitive terms. Bollas eschews all of that, and it allows the reader freedom to think and to disagree. There were parts I questioned, and by the end realized that it is not necessary for me to have an over-arching and comprehensive theory that explains all psychotic phenomena, or all patients thought to be schizophrenic: instead, it is enough that this one book helped me very considerably with one case at the moment, and gratefully to receive its gifts while remaining open to and awaiting others (noted at the end of this essay).  

Bollas starts off with a blunt assertion, which, in my very limited experience so far, I fully share: "no one a psychoanalyst meets is more compelling than the schizophrenic" (p.2). Like Laing and Atwood and others, Bollas is horrified by the "throw away the key" approach we have seen in too many instances of schizophrenic diagnosis (p.8). His own approach is team-based, working with physicians and others to provide community-based care that, where possible, avoids heavy drug use and institutionalization.

He suggests that the schizophrenic might bear more than a passing resemblance to the child who finds his or her own mind more puzzling and incomprehensible than just about anything else. With time, and "good enough" parenting, they learn how to decipher parts of their mind, and to be able to bear it. But "when defenses against the complexities of the mind break down there can be a breakthrough of too much. Selves cave in" (p.8). 

At the end of the introduction, Bollas is quite insistent that if you can catch someone--especially an adolescent--at the outset of what seems to be a schizophrenic episode, then the "crucial factor that is vital to whether the person has a chance to survive and reverse the process" is that "there is someone for the person to talk to for long periods of time" over many days and weeks. If this is provided "there is a good chance that clinicians will see transformations back to non-psychotic functioning" (8-9). 

As we move into ch.1, we get some fascinating glimpses of autobiography, taking us back to Bollas' early training and work in California in the 1960s at a school with a lot of severely disturbed children. More of this emerges in ch. 3. One valuable lesson he learned then, which has remained with him all these years, is that "almost all psychotic behavior was comprehensible if one could discover the underlying logic of thought" (20). (This is a point made by Sofia Jeppson in her new article, "Psychosis and Intelligibility," Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 28 [2021]: 233--249.)

In the third chapter, Bollas speaks of "negative hallucinations" as those things that negate "the presence of objects that are present in the world around them [i.e., psychotic patients]" (45). This was a helpful phrase for me in trying to understand a particular case right now. 

Though he doesn't call them this, Bollas scatters throughout the book some "techniques" that he uses and seems to recommend. These include:
  • finding out from the person what has been helpful, what "self-therapy techniques" they have successfully used to date, if any (47);
  • try talking about "everyday reality" rather than inner disturbances in order to give the patient a sense of safety and anchoring (50);
  • allying himself with Harold Searles, Hanna Segal, and Wilfred Bion (inter alia), Bollas advocates "listening to the free associations and unconscious communications" of the schizophrenic (50), a point he reiterates seveal times throughout the book;
  • a comfortable use of silence throughout sessions (67-78).
It is in the seventh chapter that we get the story of the book's title. Bollas says that very often "those on the verge of schizophrenia may experience profound changes in their way of seeing, hearing, and thinking" (75). A little later he names these "apocalyptic moments in which the person's worldview is changed" (80). One young male patient named David in his early 20s went through a series of shocks and changes, and described them to Bollas as being the point in his life when the sun burst.  

What are some signs of such changes? Bollas lists several, including dehumanization and ritualization in which real acting persons are replaced with people playing roles. Real people are too untrustworthy and dangerous, so now they are forced into a narrative or a "play" in which they have fixed roles. The patient does so as a way of keeping people away from him. Fragmentation here is tolerable, but self-fulfillment and self-unity are not: "a self fulfilled is a self endangered" (81).

The second part of the book opens with a claim from a patient who insisted he knew things of his life before birth. I found this startling insofar as I once knew someone who made a very similar claim. Such a person creates what Bollas calls a "mythic personality" one of whose hallmarks is often a "metasexuality" marked by "frenzied connectedness" (91). Later in the chapter he returns to this, speaking of the experience of some patients in manifesting a "rapaciously deranged sexuality" (96). 

This takes us into the tenth chapter which is devoted to metasexuality. Here Bollas speaks of the schizophrenic tendency toward "sexualizing everything" in order to eradicate "the specificity of erotic fantasy life and the reality of sexual engagement with a specific other" (97). Why might a person do this? 

For Bollas, one answer might be that "the mania of sexual omnipotence aims to re-situate a failing self within a position of power" (98), but such a self is situated in a "profoundly solitary position" (101). 

Chapter 11 is devoted to "Hearing Voices," and Bollas here notes that in addition to voices, some schizophrenics also have very acute and prominent experiences of colours. He counsels that we first recognize the voices come from the inner child, and that we must also treat these voices with great respect. We should neither judge them nor critically compare them to reality, but instead simply "ask what each voice is saying and to ask for further details," confident that in doing so we will be listening to voices whose main task is to disguise and protect the self. 

Bollas says that instead of frontally challenging voices (which I have done, to utterly no avail at all!), we should both (clinician and patient) puzzle over them, asking: what can they mean? The task here is not challenge or dispute, but translation. If you ask the patient to talk about the voices, Bollas says the effect is often profound. Ask the patient to try to explain to you what the voices mean. Treat them with dignity (109). (I found this very helpful in one case after having earlier failed by challenging the delusions. It occurs to me that this is a "technique" that might admit of wider application in, e.g., our infamous political problems now with conspiracy theories about vaccines, stolen elections, etc.) 

As a psychoanalyst, Bollas notes that voices cannot free-associate and if the patient can come to see this, it may change everything. It may, in fact, provoke the kind of "epistemological crisis" we noted earlier: the supposedly all-powerful voices can do little more than repeat their claims ad nauseam, never being able to elaborate upon their points in any intellectually compelling manner. They speak for the split-off parts of the personality, but do a poor job of it, and if their poverty can be seen and accepted by the patient, this may be the beginning of the dissolution of the voices' power.

In  chs. 12 and 13 (but really throughout the book) Bollas makes excellent and very enlightening use of object relations theory to help us conceptualize what is going on in a schizophrenic mind. External objects become invested with profound meaning, speaking for and representing parts of the self that must, for several reasons, be disowned and even disdained: "Mental processes may be housed in objects that perform them." In extreme form this can result in "schizophrenic emptiness" (135-36) as the patient puts the self into various objects, retaining little to nothing for and of himself. In doing so, the patient ensures that "action defeats thinking" (142) for thinking has been made too dangerous and intolerable. The clinician who attempts to "interpret" these projections into objects is on precarious terrain here for the patient may regard such actions at tantamount to theft and react with alarm or even violence. 

A little later Bollas argues that "schizophrenics are often precocious as children, frequently speaking early and developing language skills to a very high order" (163). He does not here mention, but I naturally immediately thought of Winnicott's famous essay (which I discussed here) on precocious children, "Mind and Its Relation to the Psyche-Soma." (Bollas later in the book talks about the somatization of certain schizophrenic phenomena.) Such children, he notes, may often be "highly sensitive to colour, light, and sound" and may become experts on certain physical objects (this has been confirmed in my clinical experience.) 

As the book gathers itself towards a conclusion, Bollas circles back to make something of a plaidoyer once more for several techniques he has successfully used. 

1) Got a Comprehensive History:
He stresses repeatedly the need to get a good history, saying that places like Finland this has long been understood and practiced. Involve the family. Almost all cases reveal there was some kind of "apocalyptic" moment, some kind of abrupt shift and change that led to schizophrenic symptoms beginning. If you catch this early enough you may be able to prevent the patient from falling into a full-blown disorder. 

One additional crucial task a history does is allow for the "restoration of human temporality itself" (179) in a mind increasingly slipping far into the past or future. 

2) Narrate the Quotidian:
Ask the patient to narrate in as much detail as possible the events leading up to the painful break or moment. Do so in a way that engages the self, the I, and allows the patient to see and recover a sense of agency and subjectivity. This he says is "crucial. If he has not given up, there is time to get him to shore" (171).

Additionally, part of the task here is to re-narrate that event, to restructure it in the mind, so that it is no longer destructive, persecutory, etc. 

3) Ease the Annihilatory Defenses:
Help to decrease the anxiety about the self and begin to work towards the restoration of the subjective voice. Before (or simultaneous with) this, however, you may need to engage in the next step, often for some time. 

4) Talk to the Patient About Commonplace Matters:
They may watch you to figure out how you navigate the world, how you are not overwhelmed by the experiences that they are, and how you seem to make sense of objects in ways that differ from their use of them. Tell them about the weather, or a movie you saw, etc.

5) Ask for Examples:
How does the patient structure his mind? What heuristics does he use? What assumptions about people and the world exist? What core convictions does he have? Where are there unthought knowns? Here is where a free-association type method (and the reverie and associations it evokes in the therapist) may be useful as these things may be discovered by simply listening to and watching the patient not just talk but also interact with the environment 

6) Remember the Poets:
Bollas ends this hugely insightful and helpful book by turning to W.B. Yeats and a passage from his autobiography. This leads Bollas on to claim--without, just a few pages earlier, at all disdaining the need for psychotropic medications and hospitals in some cases--that perhaps the "poets may have more to teach us about schizophrenia than psychiatry and psychopharmacology. After all, they have learned how to descend...to the sensorial, imaginary, and symbolic in such a way as to convey our unconscious knowledge. Perhaps poets come close to the mental intersections experienced by the schizophrenic. Who knows how this happens?" (197). 

I reach the end of When the Sun Bursts: the Enigma of Schizophrenia with that familiar sense one has of having been greatly enriched by a book, but a little saddened that this enjoyable and deeply edifying conversation has come to an end--though this is a book that will repay careful reading, I am sure. Its lasting gift to me has been twofold: first, to take a disorder out of the shadows and to strip it of the fear surrounding it that I have felt as I watched it seize control of two family friends over the years; and, second, to reveal to me that this is a population I would very much like to work with. 

Next up (but not until next month, when my academic semester is over!) I hope to read Harold Searles, Harry Stack Sullivan, and Silvano Arieti (this latter introduced to me on Twitter by Mark Ruffalo, whom I thank for this kindness. He also put me on to MIchael H. Stone's useful piece, "The History of Psychoanalytic Treatment of Schizophrenia," Journal of the American Academy of Psychoanalysis 27 [1999]: 583-601.). Other suggestions of still more authors I should read are welcome in the comments. 

Frieda Fromm-Reichmann's Life

I have been reading and re-reading Erich Fromm again for more than a year now, after having first read some of his works in the 1990s. Some of my notes from my ongoing reading of him may be found here. 

Quite all of a sudden last week I realized I knew nothing of his first wife, and so I ordered, and have happily begun, Gail Hornstein's biography, To Redeem One Person is to Redeem the World: the Life of Frieda Fromm-Reichmann.

Normally I would wait until I have finished a book to comment on it--and I shall be writing about this book upon its completion--but it is such a lovely and even thrilling book that I wanted to recommend it straightaway. Hornstein's elegant introduction alone is worthy of her subject, who rapidly emerges as a fascinating figure indeed. 

In particular, Fromm-Reichmann was able to restore to health several schizophrenics, whom orthodox Freudian analysis at the time thought untreatable, least of all by unmodified analytic technique. (Even today, alas, some people, far from Freud, nonetheless also think schizophrenics largely untreatable by any therapeutic technique except perhaps heavy use of psychotropics.) In this there are parallels between some of Fromm-Reichmann's unusual clinical successes and those of others I have read such as R.D. Laing and more recently Christopher Bollas, especially his When the Sun Bursts: the Enigma of Schizophrenia. Such stores always fascinate and inspire me, serving as a reminder not to assume in advance that anyone is beyond reach.  

Daniel Burston on Psychoanalysis, Politics, and the Post-Modern University

Several years ago I came across Daniel Burston at Duquesne University in Pittsburgh. His biography of Karl Stern (A Forgotten Freudian) was fascinating, and since then I've profited greatly from several of Burston's books, including his study of R.D. Laing, and his work on Erich Fromm, about whom I have myself recently written a chapter for an international project based at Cambridge University in England.

Burston has a new book out, Psychoanalysis, Politics, and the Postmodern University (Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), and having read it with great interest, it was my delight to be able to interview him about it by e-mail.

AD: Tell us about your background

DB: I  was born in Naharia, Israel in 1954, and raised and educated in Toronto, Canada. As a child, I attended Bialik Hebrew Day School, and as a teenager, went to Forest Hill High School. I dropped out of High School after 10th grade, and enrolled in a “free school” modeled loosely on A. S. Neill’s experimental school Summerhill, where I focused on English, history and philosophy. After one year, I left that anarchic environment and my parental home, making a meager living on the fringes of Toronto’s waning counterculture, offering Yoga and guitar lessons to raw beginners, working odd jobs in vegetarian restaurants, bakeries, gardening and landscaping companies, picking up new skills and new friends, including some gifted and creative people who introduced me to spiritual, political and psychotherapeutic ideas, practices, and groups of various kinds. My immersion in the counterculture lasted three years, during which time I studied psychology, philosophy, and political theory; sometimes on my own, but often in dialogue with friends who, like me, were intellectually curious but not keen on acquiring a university education.

However, at 21, I finally decided not to remain an auto-didact. I needed a more formal education. So after completing an undergraduate degree in political science at York University, I completed two Ph.D.s there; one in Social and Political Thought (1985) and another in Psychology (1989). My second doctoral thesis became the basis for my first book, The Legacy of Erich Fromm (Harvard University Press, 1991). Shortly after the book appeared, I landed a job in the psychology department at Duquesne University in Pittsburgh, and have taught there ever since.

AD: What led to the writing of Psychoanalysis, Politics, and the Post-Modern University?

If I am honest, irritation and dismay--among other things, I guess. When I started my undergraduate career, the university was often described to me by my teachers as “a community of scholars” (Paul Goodman); a community in which the social sciences and humanities held a pivotal, if not a privileged place. Getting a proper education was valued as an end in itself, and not primarily as a means to other ends, i.e. launching a career, making money, etc. Yes, the old “Ivory Tower” was insular and elitist, and therefore in need of urgent reform, as Paul Goodman noted. 

But the neo-liberal version of the university, which is dominated by the STEM disciplines and corporate agendas of various kinds, is worse. The professoriate has been transformed, by and large, from a cadre of respected professionals into an army of service workers whose job is to stuff and stock students’ minds with a pre-packaged bundle of information and skills, enabling them to succeed--or at any rate, survive--on the job market. As a result, we have been debased to the status of service workers who increasingly fear the wrath or disapproval of their touchy customers, rather than the other way around, which was how things stood when I started university. 

Meanwhile, as the professoriate has been proletarianized, the Liberal Arts have declined steadily in power and prestige, and faculty have been profoundly disempowered by the rise of the administrative (managerial) caste. The ideal of shared governance, once highly prized, is often no more than a pretense.

So, at the end of the day, I have devoted my entire career to scholarship and to post-secondary education, and in the process, born witness to the emergence of many worrisome trends in contemporary university life. After reflecting on them, and how best to address them, for two decades or more, it finally dawned on me that a close look at certain trends in the history of psychoanalysis and critical theory might help illumine the state of contemporary university and intellectual life in useful and unexpected ways. Erich Fromm’s theory of authority – which has seldom received the attention it deserves – was particularly useful in this regard.

AD: I was glad to see your acknowledgement at the opening of your book of the work of the late Paul Roazen, whom I stumbled upon in 2018 and read with great profit. Tell us a bit about your own relationship to him, and why his work is important.

DB: When I was approaching 20 years of age, I stumbled across Paul Roazen's book Brother Animal. During the previous two years, I had struggled with a series of books by and about Freud, C.G.Jung, the Glover brothers, Erich Fromm and Erik Erikson, and the impressions I had gleaned of Freud’s personality from these disparate sources did not create a clear or consistent impression. Freud was doubtless one of the major thinkers of the 20th century. But Freud the man was a mystery to me, rendered all the more elusive by the dense controversies that swirled around him. 

So when I read Roazen’s gloss on the correspondence between Lou Salome and Sigmund Freud with respect to Tausk’s abortive analysis and subsequent suicide, I was completely “blown away”, as they say. Thirteen years later, while researching my 1991 book The Legacy of Erich Fromm, I discovered that Erich Fromm also greeted Roazen’s revelations with considerable shock, but in due course, praised Paul’s clarity and courage--unlike Kurt Eissler, whose odd, abrasive, and unpersuasive rebuttal, Victor Tausk’s Suicide set out to discredit Roazen entirely. Indeed, I soon discovered, Fromm recommended Brother Animal to all his students in Mexico and the United States, most of whom read the book with considerable appreciation.

Having read Brother Animal, I acquired a copy of Freud and his Followers, which was thoroughly engrossing.  And since Paul Roazen taught at York University in my own home town, I resolved to study with him. I spent my first year as an undergrad getting core requirements out of the way, but much of my second and third year centered around my course work with him. I was dazzled and occasionally confused by his richly stimulating (but poorly organized) lectures on Freud and his followers, which were leavened with lengthy reflections on Norman O. Brown and Phillip Rieff; philosophers Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and Isaiah Berlin; eccentrics and free spirits like Dostoyevsky, Nietzsche, Thoreau, and T.E.Lawrence; poets like Rilke and Frost; and European and American political commentators like de Tocqueville, William Bullitt, Harold Lasswell, Walter Lippmann, and Herbert Marcuse, among others. It was quite an education! When I started on my MA, I was fortunate enough to continue on as Paul’s teaching assistant for two years, during which time I got to know him and his work even better.

Paul’s work has been largely forgotten in the aftermath of the Freud wars, but his pioneering work exposed many of the problems and oversights of mainstream psychoanalytic historiography right into the 1990s. Like Erich Fromm, he believed that the history of psychoanalysis provided by orthodox Freudians was riddled with distortions and omissions of truly Stalinist proportions. But while he freely acknowledged Freud’s authoritarianism and personal blindspots, he never wavered in his admiration for Freud’s courage and originality as a thinker.

AD: Having gone back to him in my own work just this year, I was even gladder to see Erich Fromm getting renewed attention 40 years after his death in your first and fifth chapters. Tell us a bit about your own work on him both here and in your earlier biography of him.

DB: As it happens, I stumbled on Fromm’s work a few years before I read Roazen’s works. Indeed, I was drawn to Roazen in part because he confirmed many things that Fromm had said earlier about the biases inherent in orthodox Freudian historiography. 

I think the first book I read of Fromm’s was The Sane Society, which was published in 1955, in the early years of the Eisenhower era, but which I only read in 1969 or so. What struck me then-- and strikes me still--was Fromm’s contention that an entire society can be mad, and that “adjustment” to a deeply disordered society--one largely unaware of or indifferent to its own perversity--constitutes a “pathology of normalcy.” Of course, in this context, the term  “normalcy” denotes something more akin to a chronic, low-grade deficiency disease than it does to genuine health. Normalcy, or normality in this sense reduces internal suffering and ongoing tension or friction with one’s environment to a tolerable minimum, but only at the expense of one’s development as an honest, intact and responsive human being. 

As an alternative to this kind of socially patterned defect, Fromm advocated what Martin Luther King Jr. later called “creative maladjustment.” Another thing that attracted me to Fromm’s work was the fact that he cared deeply about spiritual values, and despite his radicalism, demonstrated a deep familiarity with and respect for various (Eastern and Western) religious and contemplative traditions.

As I studied Fromm’s work more closely, it started to dawn on me that he had been unjustly dismissed by many fashionable intellectuals in the late 60s, 70s and 80s as a lightweight, a popularizer or as little more than a self-help guru. Moreover, the secondary literature on Fromm – in psychology textbooks and histories of psychoanalysis – is riddled with errors, oversimplifications, and omissions. That being so, I felt it was time to rehabilitate him, and to situate his work in the history of psychoanalysis and the Frankfurt School.

AD: In your fifth chapter Fromm appears again along with Reich, Adorno and others on authoritarian personalities, one of whose hallmarks is that they “may become attached or become passionately attracted to others. But they cannot genuinely love other human beings” (p.97). The study of authoritarianism began, as you note, in Europe in the interwar period, but has acquired more recent relevance in the US, Israel, and elsewhere in the last few years. Tell us about the forms of authoritarianism you analyze today—both of the left-wing and right-wing types.

DB: The literature on “the authoritarian personality” is now so vast that I find it difficult to summarize my own thoughts and conclusions succinctly. Suffice it to say that, as a rule, the main difference between Right- and Left-Wing authoritarians resides in the ideologies they embrace or espouse, not in their modus operandi once they are installed in power. In their efforts to win the hearts and minds of the populace, Right-wing authoritarians typically extol law and order, and promise a return to the status quo ante, or the “good old days,” which are heavily idealized, and  exist only in the collective imaginary. Their propaganda taps into people’s fear of change and nostalgia for the past, and they preach the pursuit of racial or religious “purity.” 

By contrast, Left-wing authoritarians promise their followers liberation and equality, the removal of the status quo and its replacement with a new egalitarian social order, only to renege on those promises later on. Their propaganda doesn’t dwell on the past, or indulge in nostalgia. Instead, they typically tap into people’s anger about current conditions and their hopes for a brighter future. And in theory, at least, they tend to eschew religious or racial purity in favor of ideological purity or “political correctness”, although many Left-wing authoritarians in the West have an affinity – or at the very least, a high degree of tolerance for – Islamic fundamentalism, even though they mistrust and revile Christian fundamentalists.

What authoritarians of the left and right both share in common, despite their different ideologies and rhetorical styles, is an attraction towards authoritarian strongmen who place themselves above (or outside) the law and show contempt for weakness, a strong attraction to violence as a means to solve (real or imaginary) social problems, and an eagerness to resort to secrecy, lies and deception to achieve their political ends, which have to do, above all, with seizing and holding onto power. They also have a pronounced tendency to dichotomous, “black and white” thinking, an intolerance of ambiguity and complexity, and to projection, i.e. to seeing authoritarian tendencies on the other side of the political spectrum, but minimizing or disavowing the same tendencies on their own side. All of these traits are in keeping with what Wilhelm Reich and Erich Fromm first described as the “sadomasochistic” or “authoritarian” character.

AD: Your chapter on Jordan Peterson (whose book I reviewed here) opens by discussing some aspects of the decline of the liberal arts in the university today, noting where Peterson is not entirely incorrect in blaming “post-modernism”, but that such a critique overlooks “cultural and market forces” and “the rather obvious fact that at the end of the day, most people care very little about the pursuit of truth” (136). You sift the contents of Peterson’s claims, and their reactions, and the debates they engendered, with great care before concluding that “Peterson [is] an enabler for Trump’s authoritarian agenda” (p.154). Tell us a bit more what you mean by that.

JB: Look, Jordan Peterson is a complicated man. I vividly remember an online interview he did with a crusty, conservative columnist in Canada named Rex Murphy several years ago. In this interview, Peterson was remarkably honest and vulnerable, the exact opposite of the aloof, steely, hyper-masculine presence he usually adopts in public fora. I remember thinking then that despite our political differences and all the bad press he’s received to date, this guy really means well, that he wants to make the world a better place. In that moment, I wanted to extend him the benefit of the doubt, even though I disagree profoundly with his one-sided analysis of our social ills and with the solutions that he proposes to the current crisis in the Liberal Arts. It struck me then that his basic intentions are good, nonetheless.

Unfortunately, however, Peterson seldom extends the benefit of the doubt to his liberal and left wing critics, whom he swiftly converts from potential partners in dialogue into implacable and unreasoning adversaries because of his penchant for polarizing people. You either love Peterson, or you hate him, as a rule. There is no middle ground. Those like myself, who are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, but dare to criticize his manner or ideas, are swiftly dismissed by his ardent supporters and his ferocious detractors.

That said, as a somewhat reluctant Canadian ex-pat, and as a (Jewish) resident of Pittsburgh for many years now, I was profoundly disappointed by Peterson’s public remarks about Trump after the Tree of Life massacre on Oct 27, 2017. Don’t get me wrong. Peterson is not an anti-Semite. 

However, his efforts to normalize the Trump Presidency, and to depict Trump as someone who is merely disagreeable and bombastic, rather than an authoritarian menace to democracy, seemed extremely blinkered, if not disingenuous, especially in light of all that has transpired since. Now that principled conservatives are slowly finding their backbones, and many are coming out publicly in favor of Joe Biden for president in November, 2020, one wonders why Peterson did not raise the alarm earlier, or say something strongly supportive of their efforts now. In dire situations, like the crisis facing America today, silence is complicity. What purpose does it serve, except to maintain a cozy relationship with Trump supporters?

AD: Your last chapter on anti-psychiatry was fascinating for several reasons, including the role played in it by R.D. Laing, on whom you published two earlier books. I always thought it was very much a fringe movement, but you open by noting that the “number of websites devoted to anti-psychiatry is utterly mind-boggling” (p.158). However, as you go on to show, the term is a bit of an omnium gatherum for diverse if not contradictory agendas. Tell us about how you understand anti-psychiatry and what may be valuable in parts of it today, including the critique of Big Pharma, and the still-relevant insights of Laing into alienation and estrangement.

DB: Like Erich Fromm, R.D. Laing was firmly convinced that psychological adjustment to an insane society was a symptom of alienation or self-estrangement; a form of pseudo-sanity, not the genuine article. Unlike Fromm, who leaned heavily on Marx, Freud, and classical sociology, Laing was schooled in existential psychiatry, and drew inspiration from a wide range of existential and phenomenological thinkers, including Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Dilthey, Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and religious existentialists like Buber, Berdyaev, Marcel, Tillich, etc. 

Writing in the 1960s, Laing felt that the medical-model or classical psychiatric approach to schizophrenia is inadequate or misleading in many cases, and that the evidence on behalf of the medical model was weak and flawed at best. He believed that everyone, without exception, had the potential to go mad, regardless of their neurological integrity (or lack thereof), and invited his readers to consider madness as an existential crisis brought on by interpersonal defenses, dilemmas and stratagems that landed mental patients in a “check mate” position; one that the patient does not understand, cannot tolerate and yet is powerless to change.

However, despite his reputation to the contrary, Laing was not really an “anti-psychiatrist”, if by that we mean someone who called for the abolition of psychiatry as such. However, he did agree with the anti-psychiatric thesis that most psychiatric interventions into the lives of profoundly distressed and disoriented people entail a massive reification of the person, and an invalidation of their personal experience, and that psychiatric power is often wielded for the benefit of the powerful, not the powerless. And with rare exceptions, he was opposed to involuntary hospitalization and coercive medical treatments, i.e. involuntary drugging, electroshock, lobotomy, etc.

The anti-psychiatry movement took root in the mid-to-late 1960s, when involuntary commitment and old fashioned state-run mental hospitals were still prevalent. Places like these warehoused large numbers of people deemed to be deviant and/or dangerous to themselves and others, and deprived them of their basic civil rights. In those days, psychiatric power was exercised chiefly over in-patient populations like these, which were much larger than they are today. Moreover, the average length of stay in such places was much longer than it is now. All this changed with de-institutionalization, and the de-commissioning of state-run mental hospitals, which left many thousands of formerly hospitalized mental patients to fend for themselves on the streets. The resulting spike in homelessness, substance abuse and petty crime in the USA cost tax-payers at least as much as maintaining the old mental hospital system did. And Laing deplored this state of affairs, because it left former patients profoundly vulnerable, too.

However, the de-commissioning of state-run mental hospitals meant that the locus of psychiatric power shifted gradually from the steadily decreasing in-patient population to the burgeoning out-patient population. Why? Because, now people with diagnoses of severe mental disorders – schizophrenia, manic depression, refractory unipolar depression, etc. – were treated on an out-patient basis. If they were committed involuntarily, their stay in hospital would be curtailed to 2 weeks to 2 months, at most. This is when Big Pharma stepped in. As the number of people – including adolescents and children--diagnosed with severe mental disorders started to climb, so did the number of prescriptions they received. Even people who suffered symptoms of mild to moderate severity were now routinely medicated, and their access to long term, insight oriented psychotherapy curtailed by insurance companies. This was – and to this day, remains – a financial bonanza for Big Pharma, despite the fact that the drugs it produces seldom, if ever, cure the underlying disorder, and sometimes do not even control the patient’s symptoms effectively. Alternatively, their drugs may control the symptoms effectively for a time, but the so called “side effects” and neuro-toxicity that results from extended use are very injurious to people’s health in the medium to long term.

So, to summarize, the anti-psychiatry movement of yore emerged in response to conditions and institutions that no longer exist. Since their collapse, through its collusion with Big Pharma, psychiatry has extended its power immeasurably into the “out-patient” population since the de-institutionalization movement of the 1980s. And while the anti-psychiatrists of the 1960s faulted psychiatry for adhering rigidly to the medical model, and refusing to explore or acknowledge alternative ways of understanding madness, contemporary critics of psychiatry tend to focus on the utterly-mind boggling debasement of the medical model, when it is routinely subverted to serve corporate interests in defiance of the Hippocratic oath: “First, do no harm”. Fortunately, integrative and holistic medicine have recently generated many useful alternative strategies to mitigate and sometimes cure serious psychiatric conditions which do not require psychiatric medication. Indeed, in many instances, the first step in these treatment protocols is to wean patients off of the psychiatric meds they’ve become accustomed (or addicted to), sometimes for decades.

I am not an anti-psychiatrist. But I do think that the psychiatric profession is urgently in need of reform, and that both the earlier and current critiques of psychiatry have considerable merit. While the former is obviously less applicable to contemporary conditions, it still has much to teach us.

AD: As we come to the end of your book, it seems to me every chapter is an attempt to examine the question with which you began: “What happens when people lose all trust in authority” (p.3)? In place of different modes of rational authority, you write, we often instead get identity politics, conspiracy theories, and “irrational doubt.” And nobody, if I understand your argument aright, is free from the temptation of irrational authority or even outright authoritarianism—including not just politicians but also Freud himself and his defenders, or later Lacan, Peterson, or others in the academy, psychiatry, and elsewhere. Is that a fair assessment of what you were trying to do in the book?

DB: Well, not quite. Granted, mistrust of authority – of all kinds, and in all domains of expertise--is extremely prevalent nowadays. And perhaps no one is completely immune from the blandishments of power and irrational authority. But some people genuinely prefer to function and conduct their daily lives in an open and democratic fashion, and become profoundly distressed when the foundations of democracy are eroding before their eyes. But even democracies cannot function without relying (to some extent) on authority in the secular, scientific and spiritual domains. To imagine that we could do this is merely utopian nonsense. That is why it is important to emphasize that the way in which authority is wielded in these different domains of competence has a profound impact on how much the general population is able to trust those we deem to be experts, or to whom we entrust decision making powers.

The mode of authority most conducive to maintaining democratic norms and institutions is rational authority, because it promotes competence and mutual respect, values transparency and honesty, and does not stifle the critical faculties or the conscience of those who are subject to it in the course of their growth and training. Moreover, it strives to promote equality in the fullness of time by bringing those subject to it up the level of the person in authority, rather than the populist approach of leveling things by embracing the lowest common denominator. That being so, we should strive, as much as possible, to identify and root out irrational (and anonymous) authority and to encourage and augment rational authority whenever and wherever we can. This will never restore trust in authority completely, because a healthy dose of skepticism is consistent with an intact critical faculty, and because people in power can mask the exercise of irrational authority behind the rhetoric of freedom and emancipation quite easily.

AD: Having finished Psychoanalysis, Politics, and the Post-Modern University, what are you at work on now?

I am currently researching a book on the personal and cultural sources of anti-Semitism in the life and work of C.G. Jung and his inner circle, and their relevance to trends in contemporary Jungian (and post-Jungian) thought.

Psychotherapy and Christianity in Scotland

My mother and her entire family were all from the west of Scotland, up and down the coast along the Firth of Clyde and into Glasgow. One day, God willing and the pandemic receding, I may get over to see it.

Partly because of that, but also partly because of a sense that events in London, as always, tend to outshine and overshadow others in the United Kingdom, I have cultivated for several years an interest in figures in Scotland who have been important and influential in the development of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. E.g., W.R.D. Fairbairn's pioneering work on the schizoid personality type remains fascinating to me, as does his life, some of it covered in John Sutherland's 1989 book, Fairbairn's Journey into the Interior, which I read last year.

Even more fascinating, in part because more dramatic and "radical," is the life and work of the psychiatrist R.D. Laing, whose Wisdom, Madness and Folly: The Making of a Psychiatrist I read last year.

Along comes a new book to deepen our knowledge of Scottish developments in mental health in the last century. Set for release at the end of June is Miracles of Healing: Psychotherapy and Religion in Twentieth-Century Scotland by Gavin Miller (Edinburgh UP, 2020), 184pp.

About this book the publisher tells us this:

Although a tide of secularization swept over the post-war United Kingdom, Christianity in Scotland found one way to survive by drawing on alliances that it had built earlier in the century with psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. Psychoanalysis was seen as a way to purify Christianity, and to propel it in a scientifically rational and socially progressive direction. This book draws upon a wealth of archival research to uncover the complex interaction between religion and psychotherapy in twentieth-century Scotland. It explores the practical and intellectual alliance created between the Scottish churches and Scottish psychotherapy that found expression in the work of celebrated figures such as the radical psychiatrist R.D. Laing and the pioneering psychoanalyst W.R.D. Fairbairn, as well as the careers of less well-known individuals such as the psychotherapist Winifred Rushforth.